Abstract. We consider a discrete-time probabilistic inference system where the conclusions and inputs are probability measures on measurable spaces X, X and Y, Y respectively. We are given a kernel N from X to Y (N : X × Y → [0, 1]), which represents the way information about states of affairs (represented by X) is transmitted to a receptor (represented by Y ). Suppose that at time t = i the conclusion is given by a probability measure µ i on X. Then given any input measure λ i on Y we update µ i , replacing it by µ i+1 = λ i P µ i ,N , where P µ i ,N is the Bayes adjoint kernel for N and the 'prior' µ i . In this way the conclusions evolve by conditional probability given a sequence of input measures. This is in contrast to classical Bayesian inference where the inputs are points of Y , and the conclusions are updated by conditioning a fixed Bayes posterior (defined with respect to a fixed prior) on the sequence of point inputs. In our case, as in classical Bayesian inference, the object is to obtain a (weakly) convergent sequence of conclusion measures µ i . But in our case we have available a method called directed convergence strategy to facilitate convergence: metric criteria are employed to accept or reject input measures based on the degree of belief in the current conclusion. In this paper we develop sufficient conditions to execute this strategy using L p metrics (after representing measures as their Radon-Nikodym derivatives). This work generalizes L ∞ criteria for directed convergence presented in [4] .
1. Introduction. Let X, X and Y, Y be measurable spaces, N a kernel from X to Y (N : X × Y → [0, 1]), and µ 0 an initial probability measure on X. X is a configuration space for some class of states of some system of interest (probability measures on X are probabilistic models of those states). Y is a receptor for information about X, e.g., Y is a sensory receptor. N represents the channel which transmits information about the states of affairs to the receptor Y : If a state corresponding to a probability measure µ on X is transduced, there results the probability measure µN on Y . In the literature, N is sometimes called a 'likelihood kernel'.
In classical Bayesian inference, it is assumed that there is a state corresponding to µ which is unchanging over time, and that receptor information is acquired in the form of a sequence of points {y n } of Y whose distribution is µN . The object is then to infer µ from the y n : With each successive y n we obtain an updated measure µ n = P (µ0,N ) (y 1 , ..., y n ).
Here P (µ0,N ) denotes the Bayes posterior kernel which depends only on µ 0 and N , so it is fixed throughout the procedure. Ideally the sequence µ n will converge to µ in the weak topology; this is the problem of "Bayes consistency" which has been much discussed in the literature (Diaconis-Freedman 1986 [7] ). It is important to note that in this classical Bayesian situation, the measure µ is supposed to represent all the available information about the state, its overall statistics. Moreover, all the available input data {y n } is to be used to infer µ; in particular there is no option to reject certain y n 's on the grounds that they are 'outliers,' since it is assumed that the whole sequence of y n 's instantiates µN .
In this study, however, we consider the case where the inputs are probability measures on Y . (For instance, our inference system may be part of a hierarchy in which the input measures are inferred at a lower level.) In this setting the updating of conclusions proceeds as follows. Suppose that at time t = i the conclusion is given by a probability measure µ i on X. Then, given any input measure λ i on Y we update µ i , replacing it by µ i+1 = λ i P µi,N , where P µi,N is the Bayes adjoint kernel for N and the 'prior' µ i . In this way the conclusions evolve by conditional probability given a sequence of input measures. This is called structural probabilistic inference.
Here we no longer assume that the inputs collectively instantiate some unique state of affairs to be inferred. Instead we adopt the more flexible viewpoint that any subsequence of input measures which gives rise to a (weakly) convergent sequence of conclusion measures is "valid," in the sense that it gives information about some stable feature in the environment. From this point of view the system, in its quest for convergent sequences of conclusions, should ideally have the option to select or reject inputs, i.e., to decide whether a given input measure should be used for updating the current conclusion, or should be ignored. In this paper we discuss how metric criteria can be effectively used for input selection, in order to achieve convergence of the conclusion sequence. The idea is that at time t = i, λ should be close to µ i N in order to accept it as the λ i for purposes of updating µ i to µ i+1 . One can interpreted the minimum distance between λ and µ i N in order for λ to be accepted, as indicative of the "degree of belief" in the current conclusion µ i : the greater that degree of belief, the closer we will insist that λ is to µ i N in order to accept it. This is based on the fact that if µ i represented the actual state of affairs, then the input measure transduced at the receptor Y would be λ = µ i N . This is called directed convergence strategy. Of course, the environment must cooperate by making inputs available which satisfy the criteria. For this reason, if in a given observational situation the application of these criteria results in a sequence which converges to a µ, there is justification to conclude that there 'really' is a feature of the scene which is represented by µ.
Given that we are interested in weak convergence, it is natural that our criteria for acceptance or rejection of inputs should be expressed in terms of a metric which metrizes the weak topology of measures, such as the Prokhorov metric (Prokhorov, 1956, [2] ). Unfortunately, the Prokhorov metric is, in practice, a fairly difficult computational tool. The idea is to replace Prokhorov metric computations with computations in L p after identifying measures with their Radon-Nikodym derivatives. This involves first 'localizing' to the subset of measures which are absolutely continuous to a given one, and secondly restricting to those measures whose derivatives are in L p .
The technical problem is to see that this can be done effectively, in the sense that we can state effective directed convergence criteria in L p . In Section 2 we give some mathematical background, and develop the formalism for this study. In Section 3 we obtain convergence criteria in L 1 (Theorem 3.17) , and in Section 4 we extend these results to L p (the 'Main Theorem'). We also prove that if a directed convergence procedure with inputs {λ n } results in a convergent sequence of conclusions {µ n }, then the sequence {λ n } must also converge (Section 3, Theorem 3.19; and Section 4, (2) of the 'Main Theorem'). These results are generalizations of results for the special case L ∞ , which were published in [4] (Bennett and Cohen-Lehman, 1999). It is a natural question whether the converse of (2) of the 'Main Theorem' holds: if {λ n } is a convergent sequence of input measures, then will the corresponding sequence {µ n } of conclusion measures converge? At present, this is unknown.
2. Recursively Updated Bayesian Probabilistic Inference. Suppose that we are given measurable spaces (X, X) and (Y, Y), where X models states of some system and Y models a receptor. We refer to the elements of Y , or probability measures on Y , as 'premises,' since they serve as premises for inferences about the state. Denote by P(X) and P(Y ), the spaces of probability measures on X and Y , respectively. Suppose we are given a Markovian kernel N : X × Y → [0, 1]. Recall that to say N is 'Markovian' means that for x in X, N (x, ·) is a probability measure on Y . Intuitively, for x in X and B in Y, N (x, B) is the probability that a premise y in B would be acquired if a state represented by x is transduced at the receptor array. N is called a noise kernel; in statistics N is sometimes called a 'likelihood function.' N acts in a natural way as a function
for µ in P(X) and B in Y. Finally, we will assume that we are given a probability measure µ in P(X), called the prior. Intuitively, the prior µ represents the initial preconception about the state; the purpose of an inference now is to update that preconception, given a premise measure λ in P(Y ).
With the data (µ, N ), the apparatus of conditional probability canonically gives rise to a kernel P (µ,N ) : Y × X → [0, 1], called the Bayes adjoint or Bayes posterior of N with respect to the prior measure µ. Let us assume that µ is a correct description of the probabilities of states of our system at a given instant, and that N correctly describes the likelihood of y's given x's. For y in Y and A ⊂ X, P (µ,N ) (y, A) is the conditional probability that the state corresponds to a point in A, given the premise y.
The probability measures P (µ,N ) (y, ·) are called the Bayesian posterior probabilities on X. Now, via the usual operation of kernels on measures, P (µ,N ) defines the map
In this sense we can view, P (µ,N ) as defining an 'inference map'
(given the premise measure λ the conclusion measure Ψ(λ) is inferred).
Definition 2.1. A Bayesian probabilistic inference is a map
for a given X, Y, N, µ as above. In other words, 'Bayesian probabilistic inference' means that the inference is made exclusively on the basis of conditional probability in the form of the Bayesian posterior kernel. It will be useful to conceptualize this conditional probability mathematically as follows: Given spaces X and Y , a measure µ on X together with a kernel N :
(for sets A ⊂ X and B ⊂ Y ). Then P (µ,N ) (y, A) expresses the conditional probability of the set A ⊂ X given the point y in Y with respect to this measure µ ⊗ N on X × Y . To make this completely precise, since the underlying measure µ⊗N of the conditional probability is on X × Y , we should express everything in terms of sets on X × Y and say that P (µ,N ) (y, A) is the conditional probability of the set A×Y ⊂ X ×Y given the set X × {y} in X × Y . P (µ,N ) (y, A) may be expressed as the appropriate conditional expectation, or equivalently as a Radon-Nikodym derivative;
If α and β are fixed probability measures on Y and X, respectively, then ( * ) is equivalent to the familiar formulation of the Bayes posterior given in terms of probability densities:
where
Proof. We have, for any µ-measurable subset A ⊂ X,
Which, by definition of Bayes posterior,
Note: For σ = µ, the equation σN P (µ,N ) = σ will not hold in general.
The type of Bayesian inference described in Definition 2.1 can be updated recursively in discrete time in a natural way. Given X, Y , N and µ 0 , we get the Bayes posterior P (µ0,N ) which gives the inference map λ → λP (µ0,N ) from P(Y ) to P(X). To simplify notation, let us denote this map by P 0 . We use following time index convention: we will view µ 0 and the associated inference map P 0 as arising at time t = 0, but the argument λ to which P 0 is applied as arising at t = 1. For this reason it is appropriate to denote the argument of the map P 0 by λ 1 , and to view the new measure λ 1 P 0 on X as a new prior µ 1 which arises at t = 1 together with its associated inference map P 1 = P (µ1,N ) . We remind the reader that N is time invariant.
In this way, given a sequence of premise measures {λ n }, there is generated a sequence of priors {µ n } and the associated sequence of Bayesian posteriors, i.e., of inference maps {P n }, where P n = P (µn,N ) . We can think of the inference map P n as the 'learning strategy' prepared at time n to be applied to a new premise λ n+1 which will be acquired at time n + 1. Thus at each time n there arises a pair consisting of a new prior µ n and its associated learning strategy P n . The acquisition of the premise λ n+1 triggers the transition (µ n , P n ) −→ (µ n+1 , P n+1 ). This procedure is more fully recursive than classical Bayesian inference, in which the posterior itself is not updated. Hence we may call it Bayesian recursive updating or Bayesian structural updating.
Notation 3.1. Let (U, d) be a metric space. Let A ⊂ U , and let ε > 0. We denote
With this we have:
We will call convergence with respect to the Prokhorov metric, Prokhorov convergence or ρ prok -convergence. (ii) If U is a complete separable metric space, then P(U ), with the Prokhorov metric topology (i.e., the weak topology) is also a complete separable metric space.
Notation 3.4. Let U be a complete separable metric space with a metric d; U is then a measurable space with Borel σ-algebra, U, associated to the metric topology. Let P(U ) denote the set of probability measures on U . For a given measure ν on U , and for an integrable function f defined on U , denote
Then, as usual, L 1 (U, ν) denotes the set of ν -a.e. equivalence classes of measurable functions, f , on U such that f where << denotes absolute continuity of measures. B ν (U ) is a topological space for the weak topology induced from P(U ).
Define the function
We now have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.6. Φ is a continuous bijective function onto B ν (U ). Consequently, since S + is complete, (a closed subset of a complete space) Φ transforms Cauchy sequences in S + to Cauchy sequences in B ν (U ).
for every B ∈ U. And as g 1 and g 2 are integrable, we have
for every B ∈ U. Thus g 1 − g 2 = 0, ν-almost everywhere on U , proving Φ is injective. For any probability measure σ ∈ B ν (U ), since σ << ν, we have that dσ dν exists, and (as σ is a probability measure) U dσ dν dν = 1. Thus, dσ dν ∈ S + and Φ( dσ dν ) = σ. That is, Φ is surjective.
To show that Φ is continuous, we show that for any sequence {σ n } n∈N and σ in B ν (U ), if
as n → ∞, then {σ n } n∈N converges weakly to σ. Let f be an arbitrary bounded continuous function on U . Then
as n → ∞. Thus, by (3.1),
for any bounded continuous function f . That is, σ n → σ weakly. Via the map Φ, we may now identify S + with B ν (U ). In fact, we may even 'transport' the metric ρ 1 ν to the space B ν (U ) ⊂ P(U ) in the following way:
Notation 3.7. Let σ and τ be probability measures absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed measure ν.
Henceforth, we will use the notation, ρ Remark. If U is a complete metric space, then P(U ) is complete with respect to ρ prok , but B ν (U ) is not. (Cauchy sequences that converge to Dirac measure, for example, have limit outside of B ν (U ).) However, B ν (U ) is complete with respect to ρ 1 ν .
We now need the following theorems to use L 1 (U, ν) as a 'window'. We obtain recursively determined metric criteria on the sequence of input measures for the sequence of conclusion measures to be L 1 -convergent (via Φ), and, hence, weakly convergent.
Proposition 3.9. Let (U, U) and (V, V) be two measurable spaces. Let K be a Markovian kernel from U to V , and let µ and ν be probability measures on U . Then
Proof. Let B ∈ V be given, and suppose that νK(B) = 0. Then
Since K is non-negative, this means
Let A = {u ∈ U : K(u, B) > 0}. By above, ν(A) = 0, so µ(A) = 0, since µ << ν. We have that, as K(u, B) = 0 on A c ,
That is, µK(B) = 0 and, therefore, µK << νK.
As a corollary, we apply the result of Proposition 3.9 to Bayesian recursive inference terminology.
Corollary 3.10. Let X and Y be measurable spaces. Let µ 0 be a fixed prior probability measure on X, and suppose N is a time invariant noise kernel from X to Y . If {λ n } n∈N is a sequence of premise measures on Y , and {µ n } n∈N is the generated sequence of conclusions, then, for each n = 1, 2, 3, . . .,
Proof. Use ν = λ n , µ = µ n−1 N , and K = P n−1 in Proposition 3.9. Then, as λ n P n−1 = µ n and µ n−1 N P n−1 = µ n−1 , the result is immediate.
Corollary 3.11. For each n ≥ 1,
Notation 3.12. Let µ and ν be probability measures on a measurable space U . If µ << ν, then (ν) ). We will write 1 ν to mean the indicator function for supp(ν), i.e., 1 supp(ν) . As a result, dµ dν = dµ dν 1 ν . Theorem 3.13. Let (U, U) and (V, V) be two measurable spaces. Let K be any Markovian kernel from U to V , and let σ and ν be probability measures on U such that σ << ν. Then, for any ε > 0,
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given, and suppose ρ
We make use of the following facts, noting first that, by Proposition 3.9, dσK dνK makes sense. By definition, for every B ∈ V,
And, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem,
Similarly,
So that,
Consider the case:
For this B, by (3.7) and (3.8) we have,
In a similar fashion, we may define
so that (with C replacing B above)
Thus,
(by (3.6))
That is, ρ 1 νK (σK, νK) < ε. We apply the result of Theorem 3.13 to Bayesian recursive updating to obtain the following corollaries; as always, the notation is as introduced in Section 2.
Corollary 3.14. For any n ≥ 0 and ε > 0, if λ n+1 << µ n N , then
Proof. Use K = P n in Theorem 3.13 and the fact that µ n N P n = µ n .
Corollary 3.15. For any n ≥ 0 and ε > 0, if µ n+1 << µ n , then
The next lemma provides sufficient criteria for the recursive selection of a sequence of input measures which yields a convergent sequence of conclusion measures (convergent with respect to a fixed prior measure).
Lemma 3.16. Let µ 0 be given. For any n ≥ 0 and κ > 0, if λ n+1 << µ n N and ρ
Proof. Note that, λ n+1 << µ n N for all n, implies that µ n+1 << µ n for all n by Proposition 3.9. If ρ 1 µnN (λ n+1 , µ n N ) < κ, then, by Corollary 3.14, we have
We have,
That is,
Theorem 3.17. Let X and Y be complete, separable metric spaces. Suppose that {λ n } n∈N is a sequence of probability measures on Y , such that λ n+1 << µ n N , which recursively generates the sequence {µ n } n∈N on X via µ n+1 = λ n+1 P (µn,N ) . Suppose we are given a sequence {κ n } n∈N of non-negative numbers such that
Suppose that, for each n = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
Then, the sequence {µ n } n∈N converges weakly in P(X).
Proof. By Lemma 3.16, since ρ 1 µnN (λ n+1 , µ n N ) < κ n for each n, we have,
Then, since
. Thus, by Proposition 3.6, via Φ, {µ n } n∈N is a Cauchy sequence in B µ0 (X). Hence, {µ n } n∈N is a ρ prok -Cauchy sequence in B µ0 (X) and converges weakly in P(X). Theorem 3.17 describes concretely how a system can formulate a directed convergence strategy. The goal of the system is to acquire a weakly convergent sequence of conclusion measures, a stable percept. Suppose the system has the ability to accept or reject input measures λ. To accept λ at the (n + 1)st stage means to take λ = λ n+1 and obtain updated conclusion measure µ n+1 = λ n+1 P (µn,N ) . To reject λ means not to use λ for the purpose of updating the conclusion. Suppose, moreover, that the system has the capability to determine, for each n, the L 1 (Y, µ n N ) -metric distance of an input λ to the measure µ n N , i.e., to determine ρ 1 µnN (λ, µ n N ). Now, if a sequence of numbers, {κ n }, such that ∞ i=0 κ i < ∞, is given, then at stage n + 1, the system can wait for an input measure λ such that ρ 1 µnN (λ, µ n N ) < κ n . When such a λ is acquired, it will be accepted as λ n+1 . According to the preceding theorem, the sequence of conclusions, {µ n }, corresponding to the sequence of inputs {λ n } selected in this manner, will converge weakly in P(X).
In practice, the choice of the sequence of numbers {κ n } corresponds to the system's degree of confidence, at each stage, about how close the current conclusion, µ n , is to a correct conclusion µ -a correct conclusion, by definition, is a weak limit in P(X) of a recursively generated sequence of conclusions, {µ n }. The greater the confidence, the smaller κ n is. That is, incoming inputs λ must fall within a more restrictive neighborhood to be accepted as λ n+1 . If such a λ is forthcoming, we say that the system's belief (about the closeness of conclusion µ n to the correct conclusion µ) is confirmed. If a belief-confirming premise is not acquired in a reasonable length of time at the nth stage, then the system's confidence in conclusion µ n may decrease. In this case, it is reasonable that the degree of belief, κ n , may be replaced by a larger number, to improve the possibility of acquiring an acceptable λ (one such that ρ 1 µnN (λ, µ n N ) < κ n ) to be used as λ n+1 . In this manner, the 'direction' of the search for stable percepts is responsive to the actual environmental conditions.
We now show in Theorem 3.19 the conditions on the λ n 's which ensure the convergence of the µ n 's (Theorem 3.17) also ensure the convergence of the sequence {λ n } n∈N , and at a rate comparable to that of {µ n } n∈N in P(X).
Lemma 3.18. For every n and every ε > 0, if µ n << µ 0 , then
Proof. We note that
Namely, by definition,
where,
Thus, for a given ε > 0, if µ n << µ 0 for all n, then
Theorem 3.19. Suppose we have a sequence of probability measures, {µ n } n∈N on X, which is obtained recursively from a sequence of premises {λ n } n∈N which satisfy λ n+1 << µ n N , for all n. Let {κ n } be a sequence of non-negative numbers such that Using (3.12) and (3.13) in (3.14), we have ρ 1 µ0N (λ n+1 , λ n ) < κ n + κ n−1 + κ n−1 = κ n + 2κ n−1 .
Now, since
∞ i=0 κ i < ∞, we have that
Thus, {λ n } is a ρ 1 µ0N -Cauchy sequence. By Proposition 3.8, {λ n } is then a ρ prok -Cauchy sequence in B µ0N (Y ) ⊂ P(Y ) and, therefore, weakly convergent in P(Y ).
Remark. In practice, as the numbers κ n may correspond to degree of belief, there is no reason to expect that {κ n } is a strictly decreasing sequence of non-negative numbers. (Even though the κ n 's must go to 0.) Proof of Main Theorem. Suppose we have {λ n } n∈N , a sequence of probability measures on Y , such that λ n+1 << µ n N which recursively generate the sequence {µ n } n∈N on X via µ n+1 = λ n+1 P (µn,N ) . Suppose we are given a sequence, {κ n } n∈N of non-negative numbers such that ∞ i=0 κ i < ∞. Let p ∈ [1, ∞] be given and suppose that, for each n ∈ N, we have that ρ p µnN (λ n+1 , µ n N ) < κ n .
Then, by (2) of Proposition 4.3,
We then apply Theorem 3.17 to obtain that the sequence {µ n } n∈N converges weakly in P(X). Moreover, by Theorem 3.19, {λ n } n∈N converges weakly in P(Y ).
